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Abstract 
Researcher: Daniel Clyde Schultz 
Title: Spacecraft and Propulsion Technician Error 
 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2012 
Commercial aviation and commercial space similarly launch, fly, and land passenger 
vehicles.  Unlike aviation, the U.S. government has not established maintenance policies 
for commercial space. This study conducted a mixed methods review of 610 U.S. space 
launches from 1984 through 2011, which included 31 failures.  An analysis of the failure 
causal factors showed that human error accounted for 76% of those failures, which 
included workmanship error accounting for 29% of the failures.  With the imminent 
future of commercial space travel, the increased potential for the loss of human life 
demands that changes be made to the standardized procedures, training, and certification 
to reduce human error and failure rates.  Several recommendations were made by this 
study to the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, space launch vehicle 
operators, and maintenance technician schools in an effort to increase the safety of the 
space transportation passengers.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
“Next to wars, nuclear reactor accidents, major transportation accidents, and 
natural disasters, a space launch failure is one of the most expensive losses in the national 
resources for a nation in pursuit of technological advancement” (Chang, 1996, p. 198).  
Regardless of whether the launch failure was due to component failure or human error, 
the failure wasted vital national resources and negatively affected the country’s image 
within the scientific world.  Often, these failures were a result of non-standard 
maintenance practices, which have been attributed to the lack of training and certification 
requirements for the maintenance technicians (Chang, 1996). 
From 1957 through 2011, the world attempted 6,498 space launches, but only 
5,880 of those attempts were successful, bringing the success rate to 90.4 percent.  Of the 
618 failures, U.S. launches accounted for 168 of the failures.  Having a 90.4 percent 
average success rate is not terribly low except when the cost of failure is considered.  For 
example, a small launch vehicle has a value of about $15 million, while a larger more 
versatile launch vehicle has a value of over a billion dollars.  In addition, a small satellite 
may be valued at a million dollars, but an advanced satellite is valued at more than a 
billion dollars.  When the financial implications of a small launch vehicle carrying a 
small satellite, with a combined minimum value of $16 million, are considered, a failure 
rate of even one percent is unacceptable.  The $16 million value only accounts for the 
loss of the vehicle and the satellite and does not account for the expenses associated with 
the recovery and cleanup after a launch failure (Chang, 2000). 
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April 28, 2001 marked the beginning of commercial space travel when Dennis 
Tito paid to travel into space aboard the Russian Soyuz TM-32 (Wall, 2011a).  Several 
other individuals have paid to travel to space since 2001 (Wall, 2011b).  Although all 
commercial space travel has only happened in foreign markets through 2011, the United 
States has been quickly advancing towards commercial space travel.  Several non-
government agencies, such as SpaceX and Boeing, have already conducted successful 
space launches.  The advancement toward commercial space travel creates an increased 
risk for the potential loss of human life in space launch accidents (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008). 
In U.S. commercial aviation, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires 
an FAA certificated inspector to inspect and signoff every maintenance action on an 
aircraft (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, 
Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962). The strict regulations on aircraft maintenance are an 
effort to reduce maintenance errors and therefore, the potential for aircraft accidents, 
bodily harm, and/or loss of life.  Many Aviation Maintenance Technician Schools around 
the country have developed specific courses of study to train and certify maintainers to 
meet the FAA regulation criteria (Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Maintenance 
Technician Schools, 1962). 
Significance of the Study 
This study provided useful technical information about space-system technician 
training and procedures to the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, space 
launch vehicle operators, and space transportation passengers.  The safety of human life, 
with regard to space travel, was the true goal of this study.  
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The Department of Transportation (DOT) governs the safety of commercial travel 
throughout the United States (Department of Transportation Purpose, 2010).  The 
information contained in this study will aid the Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation to make decisions on the rules and regulations pertaining to the 
maintenance of space launch systems. 
Space launch system operators can use the information contained in this study to 
enhance the maintenance procedures on their space launch systems; thereby, decreasing 
maintenance errors and resultant failures.  Space launch system operators could save 
money that might have been lost due to a launch failure.  The expenditures that could be 
saved include, but are not limited to, costs of the vehicle; repair/replacement of property 
damage; medical and insurance costs for bodily harm; and/or insurance costs for loss of 
life.  
Ultimately, this study aimed to enhance the safety of the passengers traveling via 
commercial space-systems.  People who intend on travelling into space rely on the 
knowledge, skills, training, and infallibility of the people who design, build, and maintain 
commercial transportation systems to keep the vehicles and passengers safe. 
Statement of the Problem 
Although catastrophic, past launch failures have not resulted in the loss of civilian 
life.  The one exception is Christa McAuliffe, who was among the crew of the Space 
Shuttle Challenger when it failed.  The imminent future of commercial space travel 
creates an increased potential for the loss of civilian life, and passenger safety must be 
taken into account.  Every effort must be made to reduce launch failures.  The human 
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error rates in space-system maintenance must be reduced.  It is essential that the industry 
recognize a need for specific space-system maintenance safety regulations. 
The Guide to Commercial Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Operations and 
Maintenance (Federal Aviation Administration, 2005) contains the requirements for 
space launch vehicle maintenance.  Each of the guidelines for RLV maintenance utilizes 
the action word “should” as the requirement.  The guide does not define standard 
maintenance action procedures, specific training levels, minimum experience 
requirement, or license requirements that should be mandatory for RLV maintenance 
personnel. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate space transportation failures to 
determine whether a significant proportion of the failures were attributable to human 
error by maintenance technicians and, therefore, could be mitigated through standardized 
procedures, training, and certification.  The secondary purpose of this study was to 
evaluate the minimum requirements for space-system technicians by space-system 
operators in order to develop a space-systems technician course curriculum. 
Hypotheses 
Four hypotheses were tested in this study.  The null hypotheses were: 
 It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between space-
system technician/engineer workmanship error and rocket launch outcome. 
 It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between space-
system design error and rocket launch outcome. 
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 It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between space-
system process error and rocket launch outcome. 
 It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between space-
system component failure and rocket launch outcome. 
Two research questions were also analyzed in this study.  They were: 
 Did space industry companies use standardized maintenance procedures? 
 Was there a need for standardized FAA mandated maintenance procedures, 
training, and certification? 
Delimitations 
The scope of this study covered only the U.S. space launches from 1984 to 2011, 
due to time constraints.  The design of the study evaluated rules and regulations set by the 
Federal Aviation Administration, as they pertained to space-system operations conducted 
in the United States. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
This study was limited to information that was available to the public.  The U.S. 
military has conducted many secret space launches.  Due to national security, the 
military’s launch and result data were secret and were not available to this researcher. 
This researcher conducted the study with the belief that there should be 
regulations that require standardized maintenance procedures, training, and certifications 
for space-system technicians.  The researcher believed that safety was the main concern 
of public transportation and that regulating space technician procedures, training, and 
certification would aid in mitigating the possibility of a space launch failure due to 
technician error. 
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Definition of Terms 
A&P License A three-part rating, General, Airframe, and/or Powerplant, 
for which a certificated mechanic may have one, two, or all 
three ratings.  A certificated aircraft mechanic may obtain 
an Airframe and/or Powerplant (A&P) rating through the 
FAA.  Therefore, the mechanic can inspect and signoff 
maintenance actions for which they are rated (Federal 
Aviation Administration Certification: Airmen Other Than 
Flight Crewmembers, 1962). 
Airman Certificate The certificate issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration authorizing a person to perform certain 
aviation-related duties.  Airman certificates are issued to 
pilots, mechanics, and parachute riggers (Crane, 2006). 
lbf  The symbol lbf is used in science to distinguish the pound 
of force from the pound of mass (lbm) (Rowlett, 2004). 
lbm  The symbol lbm is used in science to distinguish the pound 
of mass from the pound of force (lbf) (Rowlett, 2004). 
List of Acronyms 
A&P Airframe and Powerplant 
AABI Aviation Accreditation Board International 
ACE American Council on Education 
AMS Aviation Maintenance Science 
AMT Aviation Maintenance Technology 
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ASAT Associate of Science in Aerospace Technology 
AWIN Aviation Week Intelligence Network 
BCC Brevard Community College 
BSAT Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Technology 
CCC Calhoun Community College 
CHEA Council for Higher Education Accreditation 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOT Department of Transportation 
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle 
ERAU Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
GPIB General Purpose Interface Bus 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LRE Liquid Rocket Engines 
MEDA Maintenance Error Decision Aid 
MLV Medium Launch Vehicle 
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCACS North Central Association of Colleges and Schools 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
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S&P Spacecraft and Propulsion 
SACS Southern Association of Colleges and Schools 
SMT Space-system Maintenance Technology 
STAR Space Transportation Analysis and Research 
STS Space Transportation System 
WAD World Access Database 
WMU Western Michigan University 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
The world of commercial space transportation is not much different from 
commercial aviation.  Both commercial aviation and commercial space transportation 
require a passenger vehicle to leave the ground, fly, and land. 
Lifecycle of a Project 
Every project, including building an airplane or a space system, goes through a 
life cycle that consists of several phases from concept through termination (Cleland & 
King, 1975).  Shtub, Bard, and Globerson (1994) described five phases in the project life 
cycle with a sixth possible phase.  The six phases were Conceptual Design, Advanced 
Development, Detailed Design, Production, Termination, and Operation.  If the operation 
phase was included in the life cycle, Shtub et al. (1994) indicated that it could come 
before, coincide with, or occur after the termination phase. 
Shtub et al. (1994) stated that during the production phase “the focus is on actual 
performance and changes in the original plans” (p. 26).  They further stated that when an 
operational phase was scheduled, preparations for personnel training and maintenance 
procedures required management’s attention during the production phase (Shtub et al., 
1994). 
In the lifecycle of a project, from the concept stage through the production phase, 
engineers normally performed all of the assembly, maintenance, and repair of the project.  
Once the project entered the operational phase, the responsibility for performing 
assembly, maintenance, and repair switched to maintenance technicians. 
10 
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Aviation Maintenance History 
During the early years of aviation maintenance, “mechanics were often unlicensed 
test pilots” (Koontz, 2011, p. vii).  The importance of Federal intervention concerning 
licensure was stressed as early as 1912 by a leading aviation journal called Aeronautics.  
The U.S. Government was slow to take responsibility for air commerce and establish 
regulations for civil aeronautics.  In 1919, the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (NACA) began a campaign for Federal legislation of aeronautics, which 
included licensure of pilots and maintainers (Briddon, Champie, & Marraine, 1974). 
On May 20, 1926, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was signed into law, which 
established the Air Regulations Division under the Aeronautics Branch of the Department 
of Commerce.  The first regulations written by the Air Regulations Division went into 
effect December 31, 1926.  One of the regulations required all maintenance personnel of 
commercial aircraft to secure a license for engine maintenance, airplane maintenance, or 
both by March 1, 1927.  The provision allowed maintenance personnel who had 
submitted their applications within the specified time to continue to operate until July 1, 
1927 (Briddon et al., 1974).  The Aeronautics Branch issued Mechanic License No. 1 
(Airplane & Engine) on July 1, 1927, to Frank Gates Gardner (Koontz, 2011). 
Aviation Maintenance Signoff Requirements 
Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) contains the rules and regulations pertaining to aircraft maintenance, preventative 
maintenance, rebuilding, and alteration (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, 
Preventative Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962).  Subpart 43.3 covers 
specifically who may or may not work on aircraft.  Although certain specific instances 
11 
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allow some degree of deviation, the regulation states that only those individuals with a 
certificate issued by the FAA or those under direct supervision of an FAA certificated 
individual may perform aircraft maintenance.  Subpart 43.9a states that maintainers shall 
record every maintenance action.  Maintenance records must include the name of the 
person performing the maintenance; a description of the work performed; the date; and 
the name, signature, certificate number, and type of certificate held by the person 
approving the work (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative 
Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962). 
The FAA did make a stipulation for experimental aircraft.  Under the Application 
paragraph of Part 43, the regulation states that Part 43 does not apply to aircraft for which 
the FAA has issued an experimental certificate, unless the FAA has previously issued 
another type of certificate (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative 
Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962). 
Training and certification.  Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 65 of the CFR 
contains the certification requirements for aviation maintenance technicians desiring to 
obtain a General Mechanic Certificate (Federal Aviation Administration Certification: 
Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers, 1962).  Subparts 65.75, 65.77, and 65.79 
specify the knowledge, experience, and skills required before an individual is eligible to 
be certificated with additional ratings such as Airframe certificated, Powerplant 
certificated, or both Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) certificated.  Subpart 65.80 grants 
authorization to aviation maintenance technician schools, which have been certificated 
under Part 147, to allow students who make satisfactory progress to take the A&P 
12 
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certification exams (Federal Aviation Administration Certification: Airmen Other Than 
Flight Crewmembers, 1962). 
Aviation colleges.  Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 147 of the CFR contains 
the rules and regulations for aviation maintenance schools to be certificated to train and 
test aviation maintenance technicians for General Mechanic Certificate, Airframe 
Certificate, and/or Powerplant Certificate (Federal Aviation Administration Aviation 
Maintenance Technician Schools, 1962).  As of December 5, 2011, only 166 aviation 
maintenance technician schools were certificated under Part 147 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2011).  Of those 166 schools, only Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) and Western Michigan University (WMU) were regionally 
accredited and had their aviation maintenance programs accredited by Aviation 
Accreditation Board International (AABI) (Aviation Accreditation Board International, 
2012). 
The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) regionally accredits 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  ERAU offers two aviation maintenance 
programs: Associate of Science in Aviation Maintenance Science (AMS) and Bachelor of 
Science in AMS.  Both degree programs meet the FAA requirements (Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, 2011).  Both programs are Part 147 certificated by the FAA 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2011) and both programs are AABI accredited 
(Aviation Accreditation Board International, 2012). 
The North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCACS) regionally 
accredits Western Michigan University.  WMU offers a Bachelor of Science in Aviation 
Maintenance Technology (AMT).  The program meets the FAA requirements (Western 
13 
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Michigan University, 2012).  The WMU AMT program is Part 147 certificated by the 
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011) and is AABI accredited (Aviation 
Accreditation Board International, 2012). 
Accreditation 
The definition of accredit is “to recognize (an educational institution) as 
maintaining standards that qualify the graduates for admission to higher or more 
specialized institutions or for professional practice” (Accreditation, n.d.).  In the United 
States, the American Council on Education (ACE) formed in 1918.  By 2012, ACE 
represented the interests of more than 1,600 presidents and chancellors of all types of 
U.S. accredited degree-granting institutions (American Council on Education, 2012).  
ACE supports the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), which 
recognizes the agencies that accredit institutions and programs in the U.S.  CHEA 
recognizes 61 programmatic accrediting organizations and 19 institutional accrediting 
organizations.  CHEA recognizes NCACS and SACS as institutional accrediting 
organizations.  CHEA recognizes AABI as a programmatic accrediting organization 
(Eaton, 2002; Eaton, 2011). 
Space Launch Vehicle History 
Looking back at the wars of the world, dominance relied heavily on offensive 
capabilities.  One of those dominant offensive capabilities was the use of rockets as 
weapons.  The origins of rocketry trace back to the early 13
th
 century when the Chinese 
used a mixture of gunpowder to launch solid rockets, called “fire arrows,” (Chang, 2000, 
p. 853) at invaders.  Over hundreds of years, the fire arrows advanced into bomb-
carrying, solid propellant rockets used during World War I.  As World War I developed, 
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the first missiles were tested and used for offensive measures.  By World War II, basic 
missiles had developed into ballistic missiles powered by liquid propellant.  During the 
years of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991, 
rocket technology advanced dramatically, but at great expense, due to the undying desire 
of both countries to be the first country in space (Chang, 2000). 
As past advancements helped to create current military technologies, those 
advancements have also allowed aerospace engineers to develop space systems to launch 
satellites of all varieties and complexities into space for many different purposes (Chang, 
2000).  In the period between 1957 and 1998, multiple countries had sought to lead the 
world in space studies through their own advances; the United States and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States/Soviet Union have managed to stay at the 
forefront of the world’s space launch abilities.  The world’s first satellite (Sputnik 1) was 
launched by the Soviet Union in 1957 and weighed only 184.3 lbm.  The Commonwealth 
of Independent States/Soviet Union had produced the most reliable expendable launch 
vehicle (ELV) in the world, called the Soyuz and remained the world leader in satellite 
launches until its dissolution in 1991. 
Advances in technology allowed the US to launch the Saturn V, which carried the 
139,369 lbm Apollo 11 to the moon in 1969.  By the 1980s, the US was routinely 
launching the Space Shuttle.  The Space Shuttle was capable of launching cargo weighing 
more than 49,000 lbs into low earth orbit (LEO) and was considered the first reusable 
space transportation system (STS).  It launched as a rocket, performed as a spacecraft 
while in orbit, then landed as a glider upon return.  As of July 21, 2011, the era of the 
routinely launched U.S. Space Shuttle Orbiter ended (Wade, 2012). 
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Space Launch Vehicle Reliability 
In his article, Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle Catastrophic Failures, 
Chang (1996) reviewed worldwide space launch failures from January 1, 1984, through 
December 31, 1994.  During that eleven-year period, 43 failures occurred worldwide.  Of 
those 43 failures, 14 failures occurred in the United States.  Table 1 shows the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD space launch vehicle success-failure record 
from 1984 to 1994. 
 
Table 1 
List of DOD and Non-DOD U.S. Space Launches from 1984 to 1994 
 U.S. DODª U.S. non-DOD U.S. Total 
Year Success Failure Success Failure Success Failure 
1984 12 0 9 1 21 1 
1985 6 1 11 0 17 1 
1986 4 1 2 2 6 3 
1987 5 1 3 0 8 1 
1988 6 1 5 0 11 1 
1989 16 0 2 0 18 0 
1990 14 0 12 1 26 1 
1991 10 0 7 2 17 2 
1992 12 0 15 1 27 1 
1993 12 1 11 1 23 2 
1994 8 0 18 1 26 1 
Total 105 5 95 9 200 14 
Success rate, 
% 
95.5  91.3  93.5  
Note. Adapted from “Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle Catastrophic Failures,” by 
I. -S. Chang, 1996, Journal of Spacecraft and Propulsion, p. 199. Copyright 1996 by 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
ªIncludes all DOD-involved government space launches. 
 
 
In September/October 2010, Tomei and Chang presented success/failure data to 
the 61
st
 International Astronautical Congress on the U.S. Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) 
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History.  “MLVs from 1958 to 2010 had an overall success rate of 90% with 929 
successes and 103 failures” (p. 2).  Tomei and Chang (2010) further broke down the 
failures into root failures and stated that “workmanship” (p. 3) was attributed to 22.3% of 
the MLV failures. 
Space-systems Technician Training and Certification 
The FAA stated in the report Support Services for Commercial Space Travel 
(2008), “Training of technical personnel to support the space transportation industry has 
occurred primarily by the space transportation companies themselves” (p. 9).  
Additionally the FAA (2008) stated, “No national certification similar to what the FAA 
offers for aircraft maintenance personnel existed until recently” (p. 9).  The report then 
went on to identify SpaceTEC® as the organizing force in space maintenance technician 
certification (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008). 
Aerospace technician certification.  SpaceTEC® (2011a) at Kennedy Space 
Center in Florida states that they “provide the only national performance-based 
certifications for aerospace technicians in the United States today” (p. 1).  The 
certification offered by SpaceTEC® is similar to the FAA’s A&P certification process.  
Technicians may obtain their certification in two categories: 
1. A core certification for entry-level employees covering general knowledge in 
six areas: Introduction to Aerospace; Applied Mechanics; Basic Electricity; 
Test and Measurement; Materials and Process; and Aerospace Safety; or 
2. A concentration certification for advanced standing in one of the following 
three areas: Aerospace Vehicle Processing, Aerospace Manufacturing, or 
Aerospace Composites. (SpaceTEC®, 2011b, p. 1) 
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Technicians must have met one of four prerequisites before they may sit for the 
core exam.  The technicians must: 
1. Have a two-year technical college program degree, or 
2. Have completed at least a two-year technical military assignment, or 
3. Have held a valid current FAA A&P certificate, or 
4. Have had two or more years of on-the-job training and experience in the 
Aerospace industry. (SpaceTEC®, 2011b, p. 1) 
Once any one of the prerequisites is satisfied, the technician obtains their Core 
Certification by successfully completing a three-part test consisting of: a written 
computer-based examination, an oral examination, and a practical performance-based 
skills examination.  Core certificated technicians may obtain further certification in any 
of the three concentration areas by successfully completing the three-part test for each 
concentration certification desired. 
Brevard Community College (BCC), in Brevard County, Florida, offers an 
Associate of Science in Aerospace Technology (ASAT) degree.  “This program prepares 
students for employment as aerospace technicians” (Brevard Community College, 2011, 
p. 62).  BCC also offers several courses, which resulted in certificates from SpaceTEC® 
(Brevard Community College, 2011). 
Calhoun Community College (CCC), in Alabama, also offers an Associate of 
Science in Aerospace Technology (ASAT) degree (Calhoun Community College, 2011).  
“CCC is a member institution of SpaceTEC®, a national community college consortium 
funded by a National Science Foundation grant” (Calhoun Community College, 2011, 
p. 1). 
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Human Error 
Human error is strongly associated with technology.  Human error refers to the 
reliability of humans in fields including manufacturing and transportation.  Human error 
has long been the number one causal factor in most aviation accidents (Dhillon & Liu, 
2006).  Reliability is defined by Dhillon (2009) as “the probability that an item (or 
human) will perform its specified function adequately for the desired period when used 
according to the stated conditions” (p. 5).  The association of human error and accidents 
has many forms from design errors to process errors to workmanship errors.  
Workmanship is defined as “the art or skill of a workman, also: the quality imparted to a 
thing in the process of making” (Workmanship, n.d.). 
In a study of utility companies around the U.S., Varma (1996) found that human 
error related failures were involved in 27 percent of all plant outages from 1990-1994.  In 
one of the utilities studied, the number of human error-related failures was two and a half 
times greater than hardware related failures.  After the utility companies instituted 
intensive training programs, the human error related failures dropped by more than 50% 
(Varma, 1996).  In a study conducted by Boeing, 19.1% of in-flight engine shutdowns 
were caused by maintenance errors (Marx, 1998).  Marx (1998) further stated that 
maintenance error was a causal factor in 15% of all air carrier accidents, which cost the 
U.S. aviation industry over 1 billion dollars annually. 
Several aviation companies have developed programs in an effort to reduce the 
number of maintenance errors.  Boeing has implemented a program called Maintenance 
Error Decision Aid (MEDA). MEDA was a structured process for investigating the 
causes of human errors made by aircraft maintenance personnel (Hibit & Marx, 1994).  
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Under these programs, one of the main areas of concentration was maintenance training.  
To reduce maintenance error, Dhillon (2009) recommended two guidelines: “to provide, 
on a periodic basis, training courses to all maintenance personnel with emphasis on 
company procedures” (p. 107) and “consider introducing crew resourcement for 
personnel involved with the maintenance activity” (p. 107). 
Summary 
Every project, including designing an airplane or a space-system, goes through 
several stages in its lifecycle from concept to operation.  During the experimental stage of 
developing a system, project managers must realize the importance of developing a 
system to carry the airplane into operation.  In the operational stage, engineers/designers 
are no longer the ones assembling, maintaining, and/or repairing the aircraft, and 
maintenance technicians take over those responsibilities.  The system should include the 
requirements to train and certify the technicians and the requirements for standardized 
maintenance procedures (Shtub et al., 1994). 
The aviation industry has followed the life cycle of a project.  During the 
experimental stage, in 1926, the Air Commerce Act was signed into law, which laid the 
framework for regulating aircraft maintainers (Briddon et al., 1974).  The regulations 
evolved over the years to include requirements for how to document maintenance 
performed on the aircraft, who can work on the aircraft, who can sign-off the 
maintenance performed on the aircraft, and the requirements for training and certifying 
those individuals (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative 
Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962).  Individuals desiring to work on aircraft 
can, once they meet the prerequisites, take the tests and earn the Airman’s Certificate, as 
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well as obtain their A&P ratings (Federal Aviation Administration Certification: Airmen 
Other Than Flight Crewmembers, 1962). 
Several colleges and universities around the country have developed training 
programs, which meet the FAA requirements for certifying maintenance professionals 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2011).  Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and 
Western Michigan University have led the nation by having their maintenance programs 
individually accredited, in addition to their institutions’ regional accreditation (Aviation 
Accreditation Board International, 2012). 
With the advent of rocketry in 1957, space travel began its lifecycle (Chang, 
2000).  As of 2011, commercial space travel has only happened in Russia and has not 
made it into the United States (Wall, 2011b).  The U.S. commercial space-systems of 
2011 are still in the experimental stage (Wall, 2011b), which is the stage when managers 
should begin developing standardized maintenance procedures, training, and certification 
programs (Shtub et al., 1994). 
BCC and CCC have developed space-system maintenance training programs, 
which allow their students to become core certified in space-system maintenance by the 
non-government agency SpaceTEC® (Brevard Community College, 2011; Calhoun 
Community College, 2011).  The SpaceTEC® certification is similar to earning an A&P 
license for aircraft, except that the certification is for individuals to perform maintenance 
on space-systems (SpaceTEC®, 2011).  As of 2011, the FAA has not mandated the 
certification developed by SpaceTEC® (Federal Aviation Administration, Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation, 2011). 
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Human error has long been known as a main causal factor for incidents in 
industry.  Aviation and space travel are not exempt from that association (Dhillon & Liu, 
2006).  In an effort to reduce human error in aviation, several programs have been 
developed throughout the years, including MEDA by Boeing (Hibit & Marx, 1994).  Two 
of the key contributing factors to human error in maintenance are the lack of training and 
the use of nonstandard procedures.  The development of periodic training and 
standardized maintenance are highly recommended avenues for mitigating human error 
among maintenance professionals (Dhillon, 2009). 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
The researcher used mixed-methods to perform this study.  A mixed-methods 
review of rocket failures was performed and mixed-method survey research was 
performed. 
Research Approach 
The researcher performed a correlation study of space launches to determine if 
there was a relationship between engineer/non-engineer technician workmanship error 
and the failure of space launches.  The researcher also performed a descriptive study of 
companies in the space industry to determine if there was a need for standardized training 
and/or procedures for the maintenance of space-systems.  
Design and procedures.  The researcher read publicly available failure reports 
and published articles for 1980 through 2011 space launch failures.  This literature review 
allowed the researcher to develop a matrix of launch vehicle failures and the causal 
factors that led to the failures (see Appendix B1). 
The researcher designed a mixed-method ten-question survey (see Appendix B2).  
The survey was sent electronically to a sample of 90 space industry companies.  The 
survey was hosted on Surveymonkey.com. 
Population/Sample 
The population for the rocket failure analysis was all rocket launches in the 
United States from 1957 to 2011.  The sample was a cluster sample of the 610 United 
States launches from 1984 to 2011, which included 31 launch failures (The Tauri Group, 
2012). 
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The population for the training, certification, and standardized procedures 
analysis was all United States space industry companies, which included space 
component manufacturers, space-system developers, and space-system operators.  The 
sample was a convenience sample of 90 space industry companies listed in the World 
Access Database (WAD), maintained by Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN).  
The respondents were from space component manufacturers, space-system developers, 
and space-system operators. 
Sources of the Data 
The data for launch failures was obtained through publicly available reports, 
journal articles, and books read and categorized by the researcher.  The list of total 
launches and failures was obtained from the STAR database provided by The Tauri 
Group (The Tauri Group, 2012). 
The data for the descriptive study were obtained through primary research 
conducted by the researcher utilizing a survey.  The researcher was granted permission by 
the ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct the survey and solicit responses 
via email (see Appendix A). 
Data Collection Device 
The launch outcomes were ranked from 0-2.  A rank of “0” was assigned for a 
successful launch, a rank of “1” was assigned for a partial success, and a rank of “2” was 
assigned for a launch failure.  The failure launches were categorized into six categories 
by the subsystem that failed.  The subsystem categories were propulsion, structures, 
avionics, separation/staging, electrical, and other.  The failures were further broken down 
into four causal factor classifications.  The causal factor classifications were process 
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error, workmanship error, component failure, and design error.  The causal factor 
classifications were ranked from 0-2.  A rank of “0” was assigned if the causal factor 
classification was not included as a reason for the launch failure.  A rank of “1” was 
assigned if the causal factor classification was a contributing factor for the launch failure.  
A rank of “2” was assigned if the causal factor classification was the main or primary 
cause for the launch failure. 
The survey was a mixed-methods design.  The questions in the survey were 
designed for the following purposes: 
 Question 1 of the survey was designed to ensure that the subject had read 
and fully understood the Informed Consent Form and to ensure that the 
subject had received a copy of the Informed Consent Form.  By selecting 
yes, the subject agreed to the statement and agreed to participate. 
 Questions 2, 3, and 4 were for categorical purposes.  These questions 
allowed the researcher to group the responses by field and/or component, 
as well as their stage in development. 
 Questions 5 and 8 were designed to determine the structure of the 
company with regard to the engineers and/or technicians that assembled, 
maintained, and/or repaired the component or system.  These questions 
were used in conjunction with Question 4 to explore the relationship 
between the stages in lifecycle and the structure of the company. 
 Questions 6 and 7 were designed to determine the level and type of 
training required by space-system manufacturers/operators with regard to 
engineers and/or technicians.  The responses to these questions allowed 
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the researcher to determine the type and level of training that an 
organization should include to meet the needs of the space industry.  The 
responses aided in designing a course curriculum for space-system 
maintainers. 
 Questions 9 and 10 were designed to determine to what degree space-
system manufacturers and/or operators utilized and/or agreed with 
standardized maintenance and sign-off procedures.  These questions aided 
the researcher in determining the level of safety to which the companies 
were committed 
Instrument reliability.  The research design for categorizing rocket failures 
utilized only data obtained from published journal articles, reports from the source, and 
published books.  Reliability of the data collected relied on the integrity of the authors of 
the published literature that was reviewed; multiple sources were used for reliability and 
validity purposes. 
Reliability of the survey was verified through a check of internal consistency.  
Questions 5 and 8 were reviewed and compared to ensure the respondents remained 
consistent with respect to their responses to the phase of lifecycle that their products were 
in throughout the survey. Any surveys that demonstrated inconsistent responses were 
discarded. 
Instrument validity.  A triangulation method was used to categorize the rocket 
failures and classify the causal factors.  Two reports for each failure were reviewed to 
determine the causal factors and code them.  If a discrepancy was noted between the two 
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reports, a third report was reviewed and the classification was made with the two 
complementary reports. 
The survey was pre-tested via a group of the researcher’s peers.  A panel of 
ERAU faculty members reviewed and made changes to the survey.  The revised survey 
was sent to the ERAU IRB, which approved the survey for use (see Appendix A). 
Treatment of the Data 
The researcher utilized the ranks of the causal factors classifications (independent 
variable) to conduct an analysis of the launch outcomes (dependent variable) and 
determine if a statistically significant relationship existed.  The data were analyzed using 
Spearman’s rho and were held to a .05 significance level. 
Descriptive statistics.  The researcher used figures to depict all nominal data 
obtained in both sections of the study.  Rocket failures resulted in several areas having 
categorical data.  Frequencies and percentages of rocket launch successes and failures 
were depicted in tables. 
Hypothesis testing.  Because the data were ordinal, the null hypotheses were 
tested utilizing a Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient for Ranked Data to calculate the 
correlation between each individual causal factor classifications and the launch outcome.  
The desired level of significance was α = 0.05. 
Qualitative data.  The literature review provided qualitative descriptions of the 
launches from 1984 through 2011.  The researcher read the journal articles, books, and 
reports that described the failures, which allowed the researcher to interpret the results 
and classify the causes of the failures in the matrix of launch vehicle failures (see 
Appendix B1). 
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Each question on the survey included a qualitative block in which the respondents 
could incorporate any additional information that they felt necessary to support their 
selected response.  Due to the limited number of respondents willing to participate in the 
survey, a statistical analysis of the responses could not be performed, however some 
practical answers started to become evident. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
The total number of non-secret United States space launches from 1984 through 
2011 was 610.  Of those 610 launches, 31 launches were classified as failures, and four 
launches were classified as partial successes. 
The response rate for the survey was too low to perform any statistical analysis.  
Of the 90 surveys sent out, the researcher received six responses.  Two respondents 
agreed to participate, and four respondents did not agree to participate.   
Descriptive Statistics 
A frequencies check of the data through SPSS resulted in a 94.3% success rate, a 
0.6% partial success rate, and a 5.1% failure rate.  The failures were further broken down 
by causal factor.  Figure 1 describes the results. 
 
 
Figure 1. Launch failures broken down by causal factor. 
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The launch failures were also broken down by the subsystem that failed.  The 
results are depicted in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Launch Failures Broken Down by Subsystem that Failed 
Outcome Subsystem Frequency Percent 
Failure Propulsion 12 38.7 
Separation 10 32.3 
Avionics 04 12.9 
Electrical 02 06.4 
Other 03 09.7 
Total 31 100.0 
 
 
The subsystem failure frequencies were then categorized by causal factor.  The 
results are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Subsystem failures categorized by causal factor. 
30 
 
3
0
 
The subsystem failures were categorized into three time spans of 1984 through 
1993, 1994 through 2002, and 2003 through 2011.  The results are depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Subsystem failures categorized into three periods. 
 
The last set of descriptive statistics was done to break down the failures by launch 
organization.  Tables 3 through 5 depict the results. 
 
Table 3 
Frequency Table for Success/Failure by Launch Organization 
Launch Organization Outcome Frequency Percent 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) 
Success 141 97.9 
Failure 003 02.1 
U.S. Air Force Success 109 93.2 
Failure 008 06.8 
Non-DOD Success 325 93.1 
Partial 004 01.1 
Failure 020 05.7 
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Table 4 
Launch Failures Broken Down by Launch Organization/Causal Factor 
Launch Organization Causal Factor Frequency Percent 
NASA Process Error 1 33.3 
Component Failure 1 33.3 
2 or More Categories 1 33.3 
U.S. Air Force Process Error 3 37.5 
Workmanship Error 3 37.5 
2 or More Categories 2 25.0 
Non-DOD Workmanship Error 6 30.0 
Design Error 7 35.0 
Component Failure 7 35.0 
 
 
Table 5 
Launch Failures Broken Down by Launch Organization/Weight Class 
Launch 
Organization 
Rocket 
Weight Class 
Process 
Error 
Workman-
ship Error 
Design 
Error 
Component 
Failure 
2 or More 
Categories 
NASA Small    1  
Medium     1 
Intermediate      
Heavy 1     
U.S. Air 
Force 
Small      
Medium 1     
Intermediate      
Heavy 2 3   2 
Non-DOD Small  1 6 6  
Medium  1    
Intermediate  3 1 1  
Heavy  1    
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The first hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship between 
space-system workmanship error and rocket launch outcome.  Because the data were 
ordinal, a Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted.  The test results showed 
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statistical significance, rs (610) = .499, R
2
 = .249, p < .001.  The null hypothesis was 
rejected.  There was a significant relationship between workmanship error and the launch 
outcome. 
The second hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship 
between space-system design error and rocket launch outcome.  Because the data were 
ordinal, a Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted.  The test results showed 
statistical significance, rs (610) = .527, R
2
 = .278, p < .001.  The null hypothesis was 
rejected.  There was a significant relationship between design error and the launch 
outcome. 
The third hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship between 
space-system process error and rocket launch outcome.  Because the data were ordinal, a 
Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted.  The test results showed statistical 
significance, rs (610) = .440, R
2
 = .193, p < .001.  The null hypothesis was rejected.  
There was a significant relationship between process error and the launch outcome. 
The fourth hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship 
between space-system component failure and rocket launch outcome.  Because the data 
were ordinal, a Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted.  The test results showed 
statistical significance, rs (610) = .527, R
2
 = .278, p < .001.  The null hypothesis was 
rejected.  There was a significant relationship between component failure and the launch 
outcome. 
Qualitative Data 
Due to the limited number of survey participants, no qualitative data was 
analyzed.  The responses from the two participant companies indicated that both 
33 
 
3
3
 
companies utilized standardized maintenance procedures.  Neither participant company 
required their engineers or maintainers to have either an A&P or a SpaceTEC® 
certification.  Both companies also indicated that they believed that it was not necessary 
for the FAA to establish any oversight in the production and/or maintenance of their 
product.  Both companies further believed that oversight should not occur even after their 
product entered the operational stage of development. 
The responses from the four non-participants indicated that their companies had 
policies against participating in surveys or studies.  The responses suggested two reasons 
for those company policies: (a) security and (b) due to the intense competition in the race 
to create a viable commercial space-system, proprietary information could not be 
provided. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Approximately 22 rocket launches occur in the United States every year.  A 
94.3% success rate sounds good, but a 5% failure rate equates to approximately one 
failure per year.  Almost all launch failures are catastrophic.  Although costly, space-
system operators can eventually recover from an unmanned launch failure, but when 
there is a loss of life, a launch failure can never truly be recoverable. 
Discussion 
The overall launch success rate determined by this study was 94.3%.  The success 
rate had only improved slightly from the 93.5% success rate noted in Chang’s (1996) 
study of launches from 1984 through 1994.  Although an improvement was noted, the 
improvement was very slight.  Therefore, the space-system designers, manufacturers, and 
organizations have yet to correct or resolve the problem areas.  Several of the rocket 
failures studied were carbon copies of previous failures indicating that the industry was 
not using previous launch outcomes as input into future launches.  The problem areas 
evolved and changed over the time period covered in this report. 
Causal factors.  In Figure 1, the launch failures were categorized by causal 
factor.  Two notable features became apparent from the depiction.  The first notable 
feature was that component failures accounted for only 26% of the U.S. launch failures.  
The remaining 74% of the U.S. launch failures were due to human error.  Of the three 
human error related causal factor classifications, workmanship error had the greatest 
frequency of primary occurrences in U.S. rocket failures (29%), followed by design 
errors (22.6%) then process errors (13%).  The human errors that have occurred during 
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the lifecycle of the rockets must be reduced.  Identifying workmanship error as the most 
frequent human error-related causal factor highlights the necessity for industry-wide 
consensus standards. 
Subsystem failures.  Table 2 categorized the U.S. launch failures by the 
subsystem that was the root cause of the failure.  Table 2 confirmed what Chang (1996) 
presented in his study; the propulsion subsystem was the weakest link in achieving a 
successful launch with 12 failures and followed closely by separation with 10 failures. 
Subsystem failures by causal factor.  When the subsystem failures were 
categorized by causal factor in Figure 2, two items of note stood out.  First, in the 
propulsion subsystem, which had the highest frequency of failures, workmanship error 
was the primary causal factor of the failures.  The second notable item was that the 
separation subsystem had component failures as its primary causal factor.  Workmanship 
errors in the propulsion subsystem and component failure in the separation subsystem 
were the two main causal factors for launch failures; therefore, the industry needed to 
focus their program improvement efforts on providing the necessary consensus standards 
for all stages of the production lifecycle from design and manufacturing through 
operation. 
Subsystem failures by period.  Figure 3 depicted the subsystem failures broken 
down into three time periods.  The first period covered the span of Chang’s (1996) study 
and supported his findings that the propulsion subsystem was the weakest subsystem.  
The data indicated that beginning in 1994, the problems with the propulsion subsystem 
were being resolved and the propulsion subsystem was becoming more reliable.  Figure 3 
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also indicated that beginning in 1994, the separation subsystem had become the leading 
causal factor in rocket launch failures. 
Launches by organization.  Tables 3 through 5 depicted the U.S. launches 
categorized by organization.  NASA had the highest success rate among the launch 
organization categories of NASA, U.S. Air Force, and all other non-DOD launch 
organizations.  NASA’s success may be attributable to their experience in launching 
rockets.  NASA has been launching rockets since 1950 and the agency has learned many 
lessons throughout that time.  One of NASA’s lessons learned was found in the rigorous 
standards imposed on all contractors/subcontractors throughout the rocket’s lifecycle 
from design through operation.  Most of the non-DOD organizations had just begun 
launching rockets and were still in the early stages of production, which could account 
for their higher failure rate.  In addition, the non-DOD organizations had not imposed or 
implemented the rigorous standards that NASA and the DOD had established. 
Another notable item shown in Tables 3 through 5 was that NASA had zero 
failures due to workmanship error.  Several reasons could be suggested to account for 
their success.  The success may be due to funding, which allows the NASA 
contractors/subcontractors to employ more people and to have more time to complete 
maintenance cycles.  NASA also held very strict maintenance procedures, which could 
account for their success. 
Statistical significance.  The results of the hypotheses testing showed that each 
of the four independent variables (workmanship error, design error, process error, and 
component failure) had a statistically significant relationship with U.S. rocket launches’ 
outcome.  The results made sense in that as the occurrences of the independent variables 
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increased, the number of rocket failures also increased.  When the percent of variance 
accounted for by the relationship of the causal factors with the launch outcome were 
added together, 100% of the variance was accounted for.  Therefore, design errors 
accounted for 27.8% of the variance with the launch outcome, component failures 
accounted for 27.8% of the variance with the launch outcome, workmanship errors 
accounted for 24.9% of the variance with the launch outcome, and process errors 
accounted for 19.3% of the variance with the launch outcome. 
Conclusions 
The development of aircraft from the first airplane into a commercial airliner 
necessitated that the aircraft designers, manufacturers, and operators learn from their 
successes and failures.  The lessons learned were always costly and sometimes included 
the loss of life.  The U.S. DOT cannot afford to make those same mistakes with 
commercial space transportation, especially when the historical data indicates a 5.7% 
launch failure rate.  As the industry moves into the commercial space age with 
passengers, these failures could include the loss of many lives.  Advances in technology 
and lessons learned from previous space launch failures have only slightly increased the 
success rates over the last 20 years.  Unfortunately, the same mistakes reoccur; therefore, 
the industry must make changes to minimize or prevent launch failures from happening. 
Causal factors.  Only 26% of the total number of failures were attributed to 
component failures.  The remaining 74% of the total number of failures were attributed to 
human error in the forms of workmanship error, process error, and/or design error.  Of 
the three forms of human error, workmanship error had the highest frequency of 
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occurrence (29%), while design errors accounted for the highest variance with the launch 
outcome (27.8%). 
Human error.  Design error accounted for 27.8% of the variance with the launch 
outcome, workmanship error accounted for 24.9% of the variance with the launch 
outcome and process error accounted for 19.3% of the variance with the launch outcome.  
The human error element of failure can be mitigated.  Varma (1996) showed that the rate 
at which human error occurred in technical tasks was greatly reduced through the use of 
standardized maintenance practices, standardized technician training (both initial and 
follow-on), and certification of individuals to inspect the maintenance performed. 
Subsystems.  The results of this study found that the propulsion subsystem had 
the highest frequency of failures recorded during the 28 years covered.  Although the 
propulsion subsystem had the most failures, the failure rate of the propulsion subsystem 
had improved in recent years.  The manufacturers and launch operators appeared to have 
used the historical data to improve the reliability of the propulsion subsystem 
dramatically.  Currently, the opportunity must be taken to further increase space system 
reliability by reducing the propulsion error rate to less than 1%. 
Since 1994, the separation subsystem had become the subsystem with the highest 
frequency of failure.  The data indicated that component failure had the highest frequency 
of occurrence within the separation subsystem.  Most of the component failures were due 
to the extreme conditions present in a space environment.  Therefore, the design of the 
individual components must account more fully for the extreme conditions in order to 
reduce the launch failures. 
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Launch organizations.  The results found that NASA had developed the 
appropriate combination of standards for procedures, processes, technician training, and 
certifications that were necessary to minimize failure rates.  Specifically, the results 
showed that NASA did not have any failures of rocket launches that were due to 
workmanship error.   
Recommendations 
The following recommendations stem from the concept that commercial aviation 
and commercial space travel are very similar and that many parallels can be drawn 
between the two.  The lessons learned in the world of commercial aviation were learned 
the hard way, and many corrective actions have been established.  The commercial space 
industry can learn from commercial aviation and make the necessary changes without 
having to relearn those same lessons. 
The differences between commercial aviation and commercial space travel are 
that a space vehicle must withstand much greater forces, withstand greater variances in 
environmental conditions, and utilize different materials for construction and operation.  
Throughout the life cycle, the same management principals are applicable in both cases. 
Arguably, a commercial space vehicle is completely different from a commercial 
airplane, but very strong similarities can be made.  A commercial space vehicle transports 
passengers in a mechanical structure that launches, flies, and lands.  Beyond the 
capabilities of an aircraft, a commercial space vehicle has the capability to reach higher 
altitudes, leave the confines of earth’s atmosphere, and travel in space.  The requirements 
for maintaining such a precise system should have, at a minimum, the same requirements 
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that are required for commercial aviation.  These recommendations are not an all-
inclusive list but a starting point for the industry as a whole. 
Commercial space industry.  Everyone involved in the space industry must 
embrace a safety culture.  The ultimate goal is to safely launch and recover space 
vehicles.  Initially, establishing new safety procedures is costly; but, when the new costs 
are measured against the costs resulting from a failure, it is much more cost effective to 
make the investment in a positive safety culture and prevent the failure altogether. 
In an article presented at the 36
th
 AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion 
Conference and Exhibit, Owens (2000) discussed whether oversight or insight was more 
important in reducing rocket launch failures.  Owens identified several of the same issues 
found by this study and recommended that the space industry adopt a “school house” 
(p. 11) approach to improve safety and reduce failures. 
Owens’ (2000) idea of the schoolhouse approach requires everyone involved to 
embrace the concept that the space launch industry needs both insight and oversight to 
ensure safe operations.  Insight builds on the premise that the developers, contractors, 
maintainers, operators, and all who are involved in commercial space industry know what 
they are doing and will do everything possible to produce a top quality product.  
Oversight builds on the premise that quality control is ensured through continuous test 
evaluations, observations, and inspections.  
Organizations.  When organizations build, operate, and/or maintain space-
systems, they equate safety to additional costs.  Safety costs can stem from additional 
time required to perform and sign-off maintenance tasks; additional salaries and benefits 
for people to perform the functions of inspection, oversight, recording, and filing; and 
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additional costs involved with the training and certification of employees, hiring 
employees with higher education and/or certification levels, and performing follow-on 
training.  Those additional costs are minimal when compared to the cost of the space 
vehicle, the cost of cleanup, and the cost of lives associated with a launch failure. 
Because safety is a cornerstone to launch success, space-system organizations 
must work together to develop an industry-wide safety culture.  The schoolhouse insight 
approach should be adapted, including a cooperative agreement to share lessons learned 
among all organizations involved.  Although the industry needs to maintain some level of 
secrecy due of the proprietary nature of equipment, the type and quantity of information 
shared can be varied, which will allow the lesson to be shared without divulging secrets.  
Therefore, once the rocket becomes operational on a commercial level, it is imperative 
that all space industry organizations share every safety related lesson learned with the rest 
of the industry. 
NASA has set a very high standard that is worth following.  NASA’s success 
rates and lack of workmanship error establish NASA as a safety leader from which all 
other space industry organizations can benefit.  Organizational management should 
mirror NASA strategies, policies, and procedures in an effort to limit failures. 
Space-system organizations should require formal initial training and certification 
of the technicians who will be performing maintenance on commercially operational 
space-systems.  Space-system organizations should also utilize follow-on training on a 
cyclical basis to maintain the currency of the technicians with industry changes. 
Space-system organizations should develop and utilize standard maintenance 
procedures for each maintenance task to be performed.  The procedures should include 
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steps that require a sign-off by the technician performing the work.  Additionally, there 
should be a requirement for all maintenance tasks to be inspected and signed-off by a 
certified inspector.  Maintenance tasks should be evaluated and assigned a risk level.  The 
most experienced inspectors should inspect items that have a higher possibility of causing 
catastrophic failure. 
FAA.  Currently the FAA only recommends that space-system organizations 
should utilize standardized maintenance procedures, require standardized training, and 
require SpaceTEC® certification of maintenance technicians (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2005).  The following recommendations are provided to enhance 
oversight of U.S. space-systems. 
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation should establish space-system 
maintenance requirements similar to the regulations for commercial aviation.  The 
regulations should specify the minimum sign-off and inspection requirements for 
maintenance tasks on commercial space-systems.  The requirements should target 
systems that have entered the operational stage of development and should make 
allowances for experimental space vehicles. 
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation should either (a) develop and 
require their own testing and certification of space-system maintainers, such as a 
Spacecraft and Propulsion (S&P) certification, or (b) fully require SpaceTEC® 
certification of space-system maintainers.  The Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation should standardize the prerequisite minimum qualifications for 
technicians to apply for and receive certification to maintain space-systems that transport 
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commercial passengers.  In addition, the Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
should standardize the specific requirements for certification of inspectors. 
The current recommendation by the FAA is to utilize SpaceTEC® as a certifying 
agency.  The author believes that the SpaceTEC® program meets the needs of the 
industry; however, the author believes that the prerequisites are vague, and they should 
be better defined.  If the intent of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation is to 
require certification of maintainers and inspectors through SpaceTEC®, then oversight of 
the certification program should occur.  The oversight should include a review of the 
prerequisites; a review of program policies, procedures, and certification; and the 
approval of the program with requirements for follow-on inspections.  SpaceTEC® 
should be required to report all certifications of maintainers and inspectors to the Office 
of Commercial Space Transportation for recordkeeping and management.  The Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation should retain the final authority to approve, 
disapprove, or revoke all space-system maintenance certificates. 
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation should establish the 
requirements for standardized initial training at technical schools.  Those requirements 
should be, at a minimum, equivalent to the requirements for institutions certifying 
aviation technicians taking the A&P examinations under 14 CFR Part 147 (Federal 
Aviation Administration Aviation Maintenance Technician Schools, 1962). 
Colleges and institutions.  The space-system maintenance technician 
manufactures, assembles, service tests, troubleshoots, operates, and repairs systems.  The 
space-system maintenance technician can be associated with space launch vehicles, 
platforms, payloads, related laboratories, and ground support equipment. 
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Colleges and institutions should create space-systems maintenance programs that 
meet FAA requirements, meet the Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
requirements, and align with the current developments in the space industry.  According 
to the current recommendations of the FAA, those courses of instruction should lead to a 
SpaceTEC® Certification. 
Course of instruction.  The following courses of instruction have been developed 
as a guideline for colleges and institutions, as they develop their programs.  The author 
recommends that the spirit of these course curricula be captured in the development of 
each institution’s programs. 
The Associate of Science in Aerospace Technology (ASAT) is composed of 60 
credits hours (see Appendix C1).  The Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Technology 
(BSAT) is composed of 121 credit hours (see Appendix C2).  Both programs are intended 
to prepare students for entry-level positions in the space-systems maintenance industry 
and to provide the prerequisite knowledge and skills necessary to attain certification 
through SpaceTEC®.  The course descriptions for the space-system maintenance specific 
courses are described in Appendix C3. 
Future studies.  An in-depth study of NASA, U.S. Air Force, and non-DOD 
organizations should be funded to examine where the similarities and differences are in 
their requirements for space-system maintenance safety procedures, Space-system 
technician training and space-system technician certification.  The best requirements 
should be identified and brought forward for consensus of industry members. 
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A study to analyze the system failures in more detail, including the type of 
propulsion (solid fuel or liquid fuel) that was used in each rocket failure, should be 
initiated.  The details of the system failures should be shared with the industry.   
Lastly, a trend analysis of the component failures, in as much detail as possible, 
should be initiated.  The trend analysis should identify which components have the 
highest failure rates and propose solutions to correct the deficiencies. 
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19840609 NASA AC-62 Atlas Medium ELV Propulsion 1 0 0 1 Fuel line leaking in Centaur 
reaction control system 
1 2 
 19850828 USAF D-7 Titan 34D Heavy ELV Propulsion 1 0 0 1 Stage I engine propellant leakage 
and premature shutdown 
1 2 
 19860128 NASA 51-L STS-Challenger Heavy RLV Propulsion 2 0 1 0 Hot gas leaked through O-ring in 
the SRM joint 
1 2 
 19860418 USAF D-9 Titan 34D Heavy ELV Propulsion 0 2 0 0 Motor case burn through 1 2 
 19860503 NASA 178 Delta Small ELV Electrical 0 0 2 0 Stage I relay box electrical short 1 2 
 19870326 USAF AC-67 Atlas-Centaur Medium ELV Other 2 0 0 0 Thunderstorm 1 2 
 19880902 USAF D-3 Titan 34D Heavy ELV Propulsion 0 2 0 0 Transtage fuel-tank leak 1 13 
 19900314 Other CT-2 Titan III Heavy ELV Separation 0 2 0 0 Second stage failed to separate 
because of incorrect interface 
wiring 
1 9 
 19910418 Other AC-70 Atlas-Centaur Intermediate ELV Propulsion 0 2 0 0 Centaur engine failed to achieve 
full thrust 
1 3 
 19910717 Other F-2 Pegasus Small ELV Separation 0 0 0 2 Stage and payload separation 
anomalies 
1 2 
 19920822 Other AC-71 Atlas-Centaur Intermediate ELV Propulsion 0 2 0 0 Centaur engine failed to achieve 
full thrust 
1 3 
 19930325 Other AC-74 Atlas-Centaur Intermediate ELV Propulsion 0 2 0 0 Power loss and premature 
shutdown of first stage engine 
1 3 
 19930802 USAF K-11 Titan 403A Heavy ELV Propulsion 1 0 0 1 Motor case burn through 1 2 
 19940627 Other STEP-1 Pegasus XL Small ELV Avionics 0 0 0 2 Autopilot software used erroneous 
aerodynamic load coefficient 
1 2 
 19950622 Other F9 Pegasus XL Small ELV Separation 0 2 0 0 Incorrect assembly of the 
interstage ring 
2 7 
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19950815 Other DLV Athena Small ELV Other 0 0 1 1 Vented hydraulic fluid damaged a 
nozzle feedback cable resulting in 
loss of directional control 
2 8 
 19951023 Other F1 Conestoga Small ELV Avionics 0 0 0 2 Faulty attitude data inputs caused 
an excess number of directional 
changes resulting in the depletion 
of hydraulic fluid and loss of 
directional control 
2 11 
 19961104 Other F14 Pegasus XL Small ELV Separation 0 0 2 0 A failed battery prevented the 
pyrotechnic system from firing at 
seperation 
2 9 
 19970117 Other D241 Delta II Medium ELV Propulsion 0 2 0 0 Solid booster ruptured in-flight due 
to damage during ground handling 
2 7 
 19980812 USAF A20 Titan 401A Heavy ELV Electrical 0 2 0 0 A wiring harness damaged prior to 
launch caused an intermittent 
power signal to the guidance 
system 
2 14 
 19980827 Other D259 Delta III Intermediate ELV Avionics 0 0 0 2 Overcompensation to oscilations 
caused the loss of hydraulic fluid 
for steering 
2 9 
 19990409 USAF B27 Titan 402B Heavy ELV Separation 2 0 0 0 1st and 2nd stage failed to 
separate completely due to aa 
electrical connector plug being 
wrapped and taped  
2 9 
 19990427 Other LM005 Athena-2 Small ELV Separation 0 0 2 0 Fairing failed to separate due to 
operational ordnance failure 
2 15 
 19990430 USAF B32 Titan 401B Heavy ELV Avionics 2 0 0 0 An incorrect value entered into the 2 9 
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flight software caused the rocket to 
perform incorrectly 
19990505 Other D269 Delta III Intermediate ELV Propulsion 0 0 2 0 Combustion chamber rupture 
caused by a change in 
manufacturing procedures which 
resulted in pockets of air in the 
metal 
2 12 
 20010921 Other T6 Taurus Medium ELV Separation 0 0 2 0 One of the nozzle gimbal actuator 
drive shaft seized for about 5 
seconds which cause the loss of 
directional control 
2 8 
 20060324 Other F1-1 Falcon 1 Small ELV Propulsion 0 0 2 0 Failure of an aluminum B-nut on 
the fuel pump cause a fuel leak and 
subsequent fire 
4 5 
 20070321 Other F1-2 Falcon 1 Small ELV Other 0 0 0 2 LOX sloshing was caused when 
contact was made between the 
2nd stages and the interstage at 
separation 
5 7 
 20080803 Other F1-3 Falcon 1 Small ELV Separation 0 0 0 2 The timing of the separation 
allowed the first stage to recontact 
the second stage which caused a 
loss of directional control 
5 6 
 20090224 Other T8 Taurus XL Small ELV Separation 0 0 2 0 A faulty pressure initiator caused 
the fairing not to separate 
2 7 
 20110304 Other T9 Taurus XL Small ELV Separation 0 0 2 0 Fairing failed to separate 2 9 
  
  
  
5
6
 
5
6
 
U.S. Launch Failures 1984-2011 References 
1 Chang, I. -S. (1996). Investigation of space launch vehicle catastrophic failures. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, 33(2), 
198-205. 
2 The Tauri Group. (2012) STAR Database. 
3 Eleazer, W. (2009). Launch failures: An Atlas groundhog day. Retrieved from 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1321/1 
4 Berger, B. (2006, July 19). Falcon1 failure traced to a busted nut. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/2643-falcon-1-
failure-traced-busted-nut. 
5 Space Launch Report. (2009). SpaceX Falcon data sheet. Retrieved from http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/falcon.html 
6 Cowling, K. (2008, August 6). SpaceX determines cause of Falcon 1 launch failur. Retrieved from 
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1302 
7 Bond, P. R. (2012). Jane's space-systems and industry 2011-2012 (27th ed.). Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group Inc. 
8 Chang, I. -S. (2005). Solid rocket failures in world space launches. 41st AIAA Joint Propulsion Conference (pp. 1-15). 
Tucson, AZ: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. 
9 Wade, M. (2012). Encyclopedia Astronautica. Retrieved April 1, 2012, from http://www.astronautix.com/thisday/index.htm 
10 Cheng, P., & Smith, P. (2007, Fall). Learning from other people's mistakes. Crosslink 8(2), 20-24 
11 Federal Aviation Administration. (1996). Quarterly launch report 1st quarter 1996. Washington, DC: Author. 
12 Federal Aviation Administration. (2000). Quarterly launch report 4th quarter 2000. Washington, DC: Author. 
13 Cleary, M. C. (1994). The cape: Military space operations 1971-1992. Retrieved from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1994/cape/cape2-7.htm. 
14 United States Air Force. (1999). Titan IV. 
15 Isakowitz, S. J., Hopkins, J. B., & Hopkins, J. P. (2004). International reference guide to space launch systems. Reston, VA: 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. 
Appendix B2 
 
5
7
 
Questionnaire 
 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
Dear Participant,  
Please complete the following questionnaire.  The accuracy of your answers is very important to the study results.  Please check or fill 
in the appropriate answer.  If a question does not pertain to you, please leave the question blank.  Thank you for participating in this 
research. 
 
 
1. I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it freely and 
voluntarily. By selecting Yes, I consent to participating in the research project entitled: Analyzing 
Space-systems Engineer/Technician Structure and Training Requirements. 
Yes 
No 
 
 
2. What field/s is/are your company in? 
 Space-system Component Manufacturer 
Space-system Developer 
Space-system Operator 
Spacecraft Operator 
Please provide the name of your company in the space below 
 
 
 
 
  
5
8
 
5
8
 
3. Please identify the top 5 space products that your company assembles, maintains, operates, 
and/or repairs. Please label them 1 through 5. 
 
 
4. What stage of production is your product/system in? 
  Stage of Development 
Product 1  
 
Product 2  
 
Product 3  
 
Product 4  
 
Product 5  
 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dropdown menu reads: 
Conceptual (Just on paper) 
Advanced Development (Research) 
Detailed Design (Engineering) 
Production (Execution, Assembly, and 
Experimental) 
Termination (Final product) 
Operational (Ready for commercial sale/use) 
N/A 
 
  
5
9
 
5
9
 
5. What is the current approximate percentage of the employees (Engineers/Non-Engineer 
Technicians) that assemble, repair, and/or maintain your product/system? (e.g., 30 / 70 means 30% 
engineers and 70% non-engineer technicians) 
  Engineers / Non-engineer Technicians (Respectively) 
Product 1  
 
Product 2  
 
Product 3  
 
Product 4  
 
Product 5  
 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dropdown menu reads: 
0 / 100 
10 / 90 
20 / 80 
30 / 70 
40 / 60 
50 / 50 
60 / 40 
70 / 30 
80 / 20 
90 / 10 
100 / 0 
N/A 
  
6
0
 
6
0
 
6. What are your current hiring requirements? 
  Degree 
FAA Airframe & Powerplant 
License 
SpaceTEC® Certification 
Engineer  
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Engineer 
Technician 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please list the minimum EXPERIENCE required by your company for engineers AND non-engineers to be 
hired. You may also use this block for any additional requirements. 
 
 
 
 
7. How often does your company require follow-on training? 
  Proficiency Certification Safety 
Engineer  
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Engineer 
Technician 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
Degree dropdown menu reads: 
None 
Associates 
Bachelors 
Masters 
Doctorate 
FAA and SpaceTEC® dropdown menus read: 
Required 
Not Required 
Dropdown menus read: 
None 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Quarterly 
Semi-annually 
Annually 
Bi-annually 
  
6
1
 
6
1
 
8. How will the structure of the employees (Engineers / Non-Engineer Technicians) that assemble, 
repair, and/or maintain your product change WHEN/IF your product begins to OPERATE 
COMMERCIALLY? 
  Engineers / Non-engineer Technicians (Respectively) 
Product 1  
 
Product 2  
 
Product 3  
 
Product 4  
 
Product 5  
 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dropdown menu reads: 
0 / 100 
10 / 90 
20 / 80 
30 / 70 
40 / 60 
50 / 50 
60 / 40 
70 / 30 
80 / 20 
90 / 10 
100 / 0 
N/A 
  
6
2
 
6
2
 
9. To what degree does your company utilize STANDARDIZED maintenance procedures? 
  No Standard Procedures 
Standard Procedures 
(Recommended Use) 
Standard Procedures 
(Required to Use) 
a. To PERFORM 
maintenance    
b. To DOCUMENT the 
maintenance 
performed 
   
c. To require the 
ENGINEER/TECHNIC
IAN to SIGN-OFF 
each maintenance 
action performed 
   
d. To require an 
INSPECTOR to SIGN-
OFF ROUTINE 
maintenance actions 
   
e. To require an 
INSPECTOR to SIGN-
OFF SAFETY OF 
FLIGHT maintenance 
actions 
   
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6
3
 
6
3
 
10. To what degree do you believe there is a need for the FAA to mandate the below requirements? 
  Not Necessary Engineers Only Non-Engineers Only 
Both Engineers & 
Non-engineer 
Technicians 
a. STANDARD 
MAINTENANCE 
PROCEDURES: 
Production Stage of 
Lifecycle 
    
b. STANDARD 
MAINTENANCE 
PROCEDURES: 
Operational Stage of 
Lifecycle 
    
c. STANDARD TRAINING 
REQUIREMENTS: 
Production Stage of 
Lifecycle 
    
d. STANDARD TRAINING 
REQUIREMENTS: 
Operational Stage of 
Lifecycle 
    
e. MAINTAINER 
CERTIFICATION: 
Production Stage of 
Lifecycle 
    
f. MAINTAINER 
CERTIFICATION: 
Operational Stage of 
Lifecycle 
    
Other (please specify) 
64 
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Appendix C 
Recommended Space-system Maintenance Degree Programs 
C1 ASAT Degree Requirements 
C2 BSAT Degree Requirements 
C3 Space-system Maintenance Technology (SMT) Description of Courses 
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ASAT Degree Requirements 
Communication Theory & Skills (6 CR) 
 100 Level English Composition & Literature  3 CR 
 200 Level Speech      3 CR 
OR 
 200 Level Technical Report Writing    3CR 
Humanities  (3 CR) 
 100 Level Humanities      3 CR 
Social Sciences (3 CR) 
 100 Level Introduction to Psychology   3 CR 
Computer Science (3 CR) 
 100 Level Microcomputer Applications in Aviation  3 CR 
Mathematics (3 CR) 
 100 Level College Mathematics for Aviation I  3 CR 
Space-systems Maintenance Technical Courses (42 CR) 
 100 Level Aerospace Fundamentals    3 CR 
 100 Level Basic Electricity      3 CR 
 100 Level Industrial and Aerospace Safety   3 CR 
 100 Level Spacecraft Materials and Processes   3 CR 
 200 Level Aerospace Electrical/Electronic Systems  3 CR 
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication I  3 CR 
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication II  3 CR 
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics I   3 CR 
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics II   3 CR 
 200 Level Precision Measurements and Tests  3 CR 
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Life Support Systems 3 CR 
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Propulsion Systems 3 CR 
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace-Systems  3 CR 
 300 Level Maneuvering Propellants    3 CR 
Total credits         60 CR 
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BSAT Degree Requirements 
Communication Theory & Skills (9 CR) 
 100 Level English Composition & Literature  3 CR 
 200 Level Speech      3 CR 
 200 Level Technical Report Writing    3 CR 
Social Science Lower Level (3 CR) 
 100 Level Introduction to Psychology   3 CR 
Humanities Lower Level (3 CR) 
 100 Level Humanities      3 CR 
 Social Sciences – Upper Level (3 CR) 
 300 Level Human Factors I: Principles and Fundamentals 3 CR 
Computer Science (3 CR) 
 100 Level Microcomputer Applications in Aviation  3 CR 
Mathematics (6 CR) 
 100 Level College Mathematics for Aviation I  3 CR 
 100 Level College Mathematics for Aviation II  3 CR 
Physical & Life Science (7 CR) 
 100 Level Technical Physics I     3 CR 
 100 Level Technical Physics II    3 CR 
 100 Level Technical Physics Lab    1 CR 
Common Core Curriculum (3 CR) 
 200 Level Principles of Management    3 CR 
Space-system Maintenance Technical Courses (42 CR) 
 100 Level Aerospace Fundamentals    3 CR 
 100 Level Basic Electricity      3 CR 
 100 Level Industrial and Aerospace Safety   3 CR 
 100 Level Spacecraft Materials and Processes   3 CR 
 200 Level Aerospace Electrical/Electronic Systems  3 CR 
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication I  3 CR 
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication II  3 CR 
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics I   3 CR 
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics II   3 CR 
 200 Level Precision Measurements and Tests  3 CR 
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Life Support Systems 3 CR 
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 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Propulsion Systems 3 CR 
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace-Systems  3 CR 
 300 Level Maneuvering Propellants    3 CR 
 
Space transportation Area of Concentration (42 CR) 
 100 Level Introduction to Computing for Engineers  3 CR 
 200 Level Applied Climatology    3 CR 
 200 Level Planetary and Space Exploration   3 CR 
 200 Level Space Transportation System   3 CR 
 200 Level Survey of Meteorology    3 CR 
 200 Level Weather Information Systems   3 CR 
 300 Level Ergonomics and Bioengineering   3 CR 
 300 Level Human Factors in Space    3 CR 
 300 Level Planetary Atmospheres    3 CR 
 300 Level Satellite and Spacecraft Systems   3 CR 
 300 Level Thermodynamics of the Atmosphere  3 CR 
 400 Level Aerospace Physiology    3 CR 
 400 Level Human Factors Engineering   3 CR 
 400 Level Introduction to Space Navigation   3 CR 
 
Total credits         121 CR 
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Space-system Maintenance Technology  
Description of Courses 
 
100 Level Aerospace Fundamentals   3 CR 
This course covers aerospace industry terminology and acronyms as well as hands-on 
activities related to tools, procedures, and standard practices on space launch platforms 
and vehicles. It provides an emphasis on inspection procedures, workplace rules and 
regulations, safety procedures, good housekeeping practices and lessons learned. 
 
100 Level Basic Electricity   3 CR 
A comprehensive introduction using a broad based approach covering principles upon 
which modern electronic/electrical systems operate. Introduction to basics of electronics, 
measuring devices, basic units, resistance, conductors, measurement, sources, 
series/parallel circuits, common DC/AC circuits, and safety will be covered.  
 
100 Level Industrial and Aerospace Safety   3 CR 
This course focuses on the theories and principles of occupational safety and health in a 
practical and useful real world job-related setting. The major topics include Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance, safety standards, code 
enforcement, ergonomic hazards, mechanical hazards, falling, lifting, electrical hazards, 
fire hazards, industrial hygiene, radiation, noise, emergencies, and environmental safety. 
This course also covers identification of hazards; personal protective equipment; safe 
practices; and protection of personnel, property, and equipment in the aerospace 
environment. Safety procedures, including OSHA regulations and hazardous materials 
handling, are also covered. Basic principles of quality assurance engineering relating to 
work processes will be discussed.  
 
100 Level Spacecraft Materials and Processes   3 CR 
This course covers the physical properties and characteristics of common materials and 
commodities used in the aerospace industry. Materials compatibility, basic metallurgy, 
and treatment processes are also covered.  Additionally, this course provides information 
on aerospace applications of non-metallic materials. The use and inspection of adhesives, 
coatings, sealants, and issues with delaminations, and faulty bonds are covered. The 
effects of spacecraft fuels and oxidizers, including cryogenics and hypergolics, are also 
included.  
 
200 Level Aerospace Electrical/Electronic Systems   3 CR 
A review of the operation of standard laboratory test equipment, the measurement of 
electrical parameters, and an introduction to computer controlled instrumentation 
systems. Major topics are: general instrumentation, transducers and signal conditioning, 
electromechanical devices, servo controls, General Purpose Interface Bus (GPIB) 
overview, and GPIB software and hardware.  This course applies a hands-on learning 
approach to the soldering, wire wrapping, potting, crimping and cable lacing of electronic 
components.  Printed circuit construction and repair are covered, as well as cable 
installation and troubleshooting.  This course also covers the basics of fiber optics and the 
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fabrication of fiber optic cable assemblies, using a variety of connectors and splicing 
techniques.  
 
200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication I   3 CR 
This course provides an introduction to basic machining and fabrication skills, including 
mathematical computations and measurements as they apply to metal structures, 
fabrication, and repair.  
 
200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication II   3 CR 
This course introduces the student to advanced core materials that are used in composites 
manufacturing.  It focuses on the inspection and repair theory, including damage 
detection and repair instructions.  It provides the knowledge and techniques, for the 
student to refine and enhance his or her skills on projects using composite materials.  
 
200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics I   3 CR 
This course applies a hands-on approach to the identification, uses, and care of tools and 
equipment used in aerospace-systems. Blueprint reading, geometric dimensioning, and 
tolerancing for English and metric measuring systems are included.  
 
200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics II   3 CR 
This course provides an introduction to orbital mechanics or astrodynamics, as applicable 
to ballistics and celestial mechanics, and the practical problems concerning the motion of 
rockets and other spacecraft. This course also focuses on spacecraft trajectories, including 
orbital maneuvers, orbit plane changes, and interplanetary transfers, and how mission 
planners use aerospace mechanics to predict the results of propulsive maneuvers. 
 
200 Level Precision Measurements and Tests   3 CR 
This course covers electrical and mechanical testing procedures (primarily non-
destructive testing), equipment, measurements, and instrumentation involved in 
aerospace-systems. Verification of tool and equipment calibration is also covered. This 
course provides information in aerospace applications of non-metallic materials.  
 
300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Life Support Systems   3 CR 
This course provides an introduction to expendable and reusable spacecraft systems 
including Environmental Control and Life Support Systems. The interaction of systems 
with computerized data acquisition systems is also covered. 
 
300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Propulsion Systems   3 CR 
This course introduces the student to the classification of propulsion systems, such as 
chemical, electric, and nuclear propulsion, with a focus on the analysis and performance 
of each system. Key features, performance characteristics, and maintenance techniques of 
existing and planned (near future) propulsion systems for use on spacecraft are 
summarized.  
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300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace-Systems   3 CR 
This course provides an introduction to expendable and reusable spacecraft systems 
including hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, propulsion, mechanical, and HVAC.  It 
focuses on techniques used in repair and troubleshooting of these systems. 
 
300 Level Maneuvering Propellants   3 CR 
This course includes a familiarization of fluid system components, their characteristics, 
and applications.  Storable propellants, such as cryogenic and hypergolic materials and 
high-pressure systems, are also covered.  
